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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STAT! <>! t . i . \ . i 
ALAlx ^ARSEN, 
I V I I l l U l l l ' l 
DEBRA D. LARSEN, 
Respondent/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040630-CA 
T) r i noriLy No. 
bl<.! < '•• INDENT/APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon ilir, ' ,<HIII I'IHMUHI m Utah Code Annotated, 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellant intends to present the lulloumg i»iu , I m n : 
a. Wlic111''i ill" in,il u ui considering evidence of the settlement 
agreement entered into between the parties regarding the sale ui vi;-_ :.:• iel 
owned by RCI I' 
b. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Respondent had 
acknowledged a rental amount due to Robert and LaRue Larsen. 
c. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Respondent has 
acknowledged a debt owed for "inventory" and/or a debt owed for interest on 
any amounts due to Robert and LaRue Larsen. 
d. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations does 
not apply. 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Section 78-12-44, UCA; 78-12-25, UCA; Morris v. Russell, 236 P.2d 451; Wells 
Fargo Bank v. Temple View Estates, 82 P.3d 655; Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtlijf, 83 
P.2d 733 (Utah 1934). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Court entertained testimony in regards to the sale of the motel owned 
by the parties. The Court received testimony that Respondent received Two Hundred 
Thousand Dollars ($200,000.00) and Petitioner received One Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) from the sale of the motel business. Respondent's 
counsel objected to the testimony. (Tr. p. 12-13; 34-37) 
2. The Court concluded that a debt was owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen in 
the amount of One Hundred One Thousand One Hundred Twenty-five and 93/100 
Dollars ($101,125.93). The Court concluded that the majority of this debt was for 
past unpaid rent. The Court allowed an "inventory" amount of Six Thousand Six 
Hundred Thirty-four and 35/100 Dollars ($6,634.35) to be included in that total, 
although there was no testimony supporting any agreement regarding this matter. 
(Tr. p. 45-46) 
3. The Court concluded that the total debt of One Hundred One Thousand One 
Hundred Twenty-five and 93/100 Dollars ($101,125.93) was owed, which amount 
included interest at the rate of 12 percent (12%), although there was no testimony 
supporting any agreement regarding the amount of interest. (Tr. p. 110, 117-118) 
4. The Court concluded that the rental amount owed to Robert and LaRue 
Larsen was not barred by the statute of limitations because both parties 
acknowledged it as a valid debt. 
5. The Court entered into evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 10, and Petitioner 
testified that this document was prepared by the bank to show a balance due on the 
second mortgage of Twenty-one Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-nine Dollars 
($21,869.00). The Court entered into evidence Petitioner's Exhibit 11, and Petitioner 
testified that this document was prepared by the bank to show a balance due on the 
van of Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty-one Dollars ($10,731.00). (Tr. p. 30-31) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE OF THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES REGARDING THE 
SALE OF THE MOTEL OWNED BY RCI, LC 
3 
The Court erred by allowing evidence of the settlement agreement concerning the 
sale of the motel owned by RCI, LC over the timely objection based on surprise. The Court 
made a ruling inconsistent with a prior ruling on evidence. The Court allowed testimony of 
a settlement compromise. 
A. Surprise 
Respondent asserts that the court committed error in considering evjidence of the 
settlement agreement entered into between the parties regarding the sale|ot the motel 
owned by RCI, LC. According to Rule 59(a)(3) of the Utah Rules of Cifil Procedure 
(U.R.C.P.) a Court may grant a new trial if there exists "accident or surprise, wjiich ordinary 
prudence could not have guarded against." In this case there was accident or surprise which 
ordinary prudence would not have guarded against. Respondent claims suijprise for the 
following reasons: The parties entered into an Escrow Instructions and Waivef Agreement 
entered as Exhibit 5 at trial. Paragraph 4 of the Escrow Instructions and Waiver Agreement 
provides as follows: 
The parties represent and agree that Debra D. Larsen will receive as her share and 
interest in RCI, LC, the sum of Two Hundred Thousand Dollars ($200,05)0.00). The 
parties authorize D Land Title Company to retain Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000.00) from the proceeds of the sale to be disbursed to Debra E). Larsen. 
It was and is the position of Respondent that the amount awarded to her|constituted 
her share, and it was never intended that it would be diminished. At trial| Petitioner 
testified about the sale of RCI, LC, and the Court entertained testimony over the Objection of 
Respondent's counsel. Respondent did not or could not have reasonably anticipated that a 
matter that was settled between the parties would become a matter for further consideration 
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at trial. Respondent was unprepared to present evidence of the total amounts received from 
the sale of the property and the amounts available for disbursements to the parties where it 
was, in her opinion, a settled issue. 
Respondent believes that on the facts of this case there was surprise that the 
ordinarily prudent person would not have foreseen and because of that surprise the amount 
of money she should have received from the marital estate was greatly diminished. 
Respondent contends that the trial Court erred in admitting testimony of a setded portion of 
the case and then changing the terms of the settlement. 
B. Inconsistent Ruling 
At trial, Petitioner and Jerry Larsen testified that Petitioner received One Hundred 
Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) as his share from the sale of the hotel. Respondent's 
counsel objected at trial to the testimony that Petitioner received One Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00), stating, among other reasons, there was no evidence to 
support the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($150,000.00) as a correct 
representation of Petitioner's proceeds. The Court sustained the objection and stated "Each 
of them will have $200,000.00 on the final ledger sheet as their interest in the hotel." (Tr. 
p. 135 In. 7-10). However, in the Court's ruling, he stated "The testimony is that on the 
hotel Debbie received $200,000.00 Alan received $150,000.00, leaving Alan with a 
$50,000.00 shortfall." (Tr. p. 171 In. 17) (See also Tr. p. 179 In. 15-22). The Court 
reversed itself without any evidentiary basis for doing so. The Court then adjusted the 
distribution of marital assets to make up the "shortfall" to Petitioner. Respondent lost the 
benefit of her settlement and received a lesser portion of the marital estate. 
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Respondent would be able to demonstrate, upon reopening of this case and the 
allowance of additional testimony, that Petitioner's portion from the proceeds of the sale 
was, in fact, an amount equal to or greater than the Two Hundred Thousand Dollars 
($200,000.00) given to Respondent as her share of the proceeds of the sale of the Richfield 
Comfort Inn and adjacent six (6) acres of property. 
C. Settlement Compromise 
It was improper for the Court to accept evidence of a settlement compromise for the 
purpose of showing the amount of that settlement. 
According to the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408, evidence of "accepting or offering 
or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to 
prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount [emphasis added]." 
For this reason the Court should not have permitted testimony concerning the 
amounts of money received by the parties for the motel settlement compromise during this 
trial. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN THE DEBT CALCULATIONS OWED TO 
ROBERT AND LARUE LARSEN 
The trial Court erred in its debt calculations owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen by it 
concluding that the statute of limitation does not apply in this case, by concluding that 
Respondent acknowledged the rental amount due, and by concluding that Respondent 
acknowledged a debt owed for "inventory" and "interest" amounts due. 
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A. Statute of Limitations 
The trial Court erred in finding that the statute of limitations was inapplicable. The 
rental agreement was a verbal, rental agreement. The statute of limitations only allows 
recovery back four years. (§78-12-25) The Court found the statute of limitations not 
applicable because Respondent had acknowledged the debt. Respondent however did not 
acknowledge the debt. Respondent, Debra D. Larsen, was called as a witness at trial. Mr. 
Neeley, attorney for Petitioner, showed Respondent Exhibit No. 26 and made reference to 
the several pages of the exhibit. The exhibit purports to be an accounting of rent due to 
Petitioner's parents for the business premises occupied by Fashion Furniture. (Tr. p. 112-
113) The testimony elicited indicates that Exhibit No. 26 was a computation of rent due 
which had been passed between the parties during several negotiation stages. The 
calculation had been prepared by Robert and/or LaRue Larsen or Petitioner. Respondent 
did not agree that it was accurate nor did she agree that the rent was owed. The evidence 
presented to the Court clearly shows that the amount of rent charged by Robert and LaRue 
Larsen was pursuant to a verbal, rental agreement and at best would be considered a 
month-to-month obligation. 
Section 78-12-25, UCA, provides in pertinent part: 
An action may be brought within four years: (1) upon a contract, obligation, or 
liability not founded upon an instrument in writing;...provided, that action in all of 
the foregoing cases may be commenced at anytime within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is received;... 
In Morris v. Russell, 236 P.2d 451, William Shields started an action to recover money 
for working for the defendants, Russell. He was awarded $4,500.00. Mr. Shields died after 
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the trial and his administrator was named as a respondent in the appeal. Shields began 
working for the defendant sometime in 1941. Defendants owned a small farm and Shields 
performed light work on the farm for his board and room plus occasional small amounts of 
money. In June of 1943, the defendant sold the farm and bought a motor court. Shields 
accompanied the defendants to the motor court under an agreement that he would help 
maintain it and receive $100.00 per month. He was not paid $100.00 per month but 
received the same compensation as he had received for working on the farm. In August of 
1949, the relationship was terminated and Shields commenced an action to recover 
compensation for his work. Defendants raised the statute of limitations as a defense 
claiming that the plaintiff, Shields, could only recover for four years prior to the 
commencement of his action. The Supreme Court concluded: 
From the plaintiffs own evidence, it could only be concluded that his services were 
compensable monthly. This being so, the statute would begin to run at the end of 
each month. Thus it has run against any payment due more than four years prior to 
the date of the filing of this suit, February 14,1950, and the court erred in allowing 
the jury to consider any compensation before February 14, 1946. 
In this case, the lease was not ever reduced to writing. The lease was an oral lease 
and would be most properly construed as a month-to-month lease. The Court rejected 
Respondent's claim that the statute of limitations prevented Robert and LaRue Larsen from 
recovering rent due anytime before four years of the date of trial, to wit: February 23, 
2004. The trial Court concluded rather that Respondent had acknowledged an existing 
liability, debt or claim within the meaning of §78-12-44 of the Utah Code. 
Section 78-12-44, UCA, states in part: 
In any case founded on contracts, when...an acknowledgement of an existing 
8 
liability, debt or claim...shall have been made, an action may be brought within the 
time prescribed for the same after such payment, acknowledgement or promise; but 
such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be 
charged thereby. 
Petitioner's counsel argued, at trial, that the statute of limitations began to run after 
Respondent made an enforceable acknowledgement of the debt. In Wells Fargo Bank v. 
Temple View Investments, 82 P.3d 655 (Utah App 2003) this Court interpreted the 
acknowledgement exception to the statute of limitations. In Wells Fargo, plaintiff brought 
an action for breach of contract against defendant, Temple View Investments, based on a 
Promissory Note dated November 1, 1985. The Note had been acquired by Wells Fargo in 
an unrelated lawsuit. Plaintiff, through counsel, met with principals of Temple View 
Investments in an effort to collect or compromise the Note. In August of 1997, a Thomas 
Rogan, attorney for Temple View Investments, wrote a letter to plaintiff indicating a desire 
to compromise the Note. A compromise agreement was not reached. The Note became due 
by its own terms on June 1,1995. Wells Fargo filed suit against Temple View on May 15, 
2002, six years and eleven months after the due date. Temple View filed a Motion to 
Dismiss plaintiffs action based upon the statute of limitations in §78-12-23, UCA. Wells 
Fargo opposed the Motion with an Affidavit from counsel which attempted to introduce the 
Rogan letter into the record. Wells Fargo argued that the Rogan letter constituted an 
acknowledgement of the debt and thus renewed the obligation. The District Court ruled 
that the Rogan was not a reaffirmation of the debt and granted Temple View's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the statute of limitations. Wells Fargo argued on appeal that 
the "Rogan letter" constituted an enforceable acknowledgement of a debt. The Rogan letter 
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stated in part: 
...As we have discussed recently, this may be a good time to resolve the long 
outstanding matter of liability of the November 1, 1985, Promissory Note from 
Temple View Investments. As you know, I represent Temple View 
Investments...principals Stuart, D'Evelyn and Bennion. The accruals on the Note 
exceed $390,000.00. 
This Court rejected the argument of Wells Fargo and stated: 
The Utah Supreme Court has interpreted §78-12-44 to mean that in order to file an 
action outside the statute of limitations, based on a new acknowledgment, the 
written acknowledgement must be clear, distinct, direct, unqualified, and intentional: 
in Salt Lake Transfer Co. v. Shurtliff, 83 Utah 488, 489, 30 P.2d 733, 736 (1934) Mr. 
Justice Folland, speaking for this Court, noted...the rule that "nothing short of a 
distinct, direct, unqualified, and intentional admission of a present, subsisting debt 
on which a party is liable will be sufficient to take the obligation out of the statute 
and start it running anew... 
The acknowledgement necessary to start the statute (running) anew must be more 
than a hint, a reference, or a discussion of an old debt; it must amount to a clear 
recognition of the claim and liability as presently existing." 
In this case, Petitioner's counsel introduced Exhibit No. 26 by proffer and then 
examined Respondent regarding the exhibit. The colloquy went as follows: 
Q. Okay. Now I'm going to hand you Exhibit No.27. Do you recognize that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is that? 
A. This is the document I prepared the night before we came to court in December. 
Alan presented the night before court with the list showing that we owed his parents 
one hundred and whatever thousand dollars. I prepared this after that. 
Q. In fact, it corresponds with November 2nd look at November 2nd of No. 26 that 
corresponds with $101,000 on the exhibit you prepared, corresponds exactly to the 
$101,000 on your exhibit. 
A. It is. Can I tell you why I did my exhibit? 
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Q. Thank you, but your counsel can ask you whatever questions -
A. Okay. (Tr. p. 112-113). 
At the conclusion of the trial, the following colloquy occurred between Respondent's 
counsel and Petitioner's counsel and the Court: 
MR. WEIGHT: Your Honor, I didn't ask my client about Exhibit No. 27. If the Court 
will get that, I'll just tell the Court that her testimony was going to be. 
THE COURT: Which one is 27? 
MR. NEELEY: That's t h e -
THE COURT: Oh, okay, good. That's this most recent one. Okay, go ahead. You're 
going to make a proffer about that. Please do. 
ME. WEIGHT: (Inaudible) wasn't initially (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Yeah, okay. 
MR. WEIGHT: And she will testify that before we agreed finally, that the business 
would be evaluated and we would use the value of inventory as of November 1st, 
2002. Before that all occurred and we reached that agreement, we actually did it on 
an order to show cause hearing. 
We were trying to figure out how much my client should get for Fashion Furniture. 
We had taken care of the motel matter and were trying to resolve Fashion Furniture. 
So these exhibits, the one No. 27 was prepared simply as her calculations of what 
she thought the value of the business was, what she thought she should receive. 
That exhibit I think doesn't really help us at all, because the - as part of the 
negotiation, whereas the other exhibit, No. 26, is simply a business record. That 
would be her testimony, your Honor. (Tr. p. 136-137) 
During the negotiation stages of the case, counsel for Petitioner and Respondent 
made an effort to determine Respondent's equity in the business known as Fashion 
Furniture. In order to do so, it was necessary to establish the value of the assets minus the 
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value of the debt. Petitioner prepared an exhibit to show the amount of rental owed to his 
parents, Robert and LaRue Larsen. It was presented to Respondent. Respondent in turn 
prepared what became Exhibit No. 27 to demonstrate only for illustrative purposes that if 
the amount of the claimed rent owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen were accepted, that 
Respondent's equity in the business would still be an amount greater than had been 
previously offered by Petitioner to Respondent to resolve that part of the case. The 
document was prepared as a part of a negotiation for settlement. It was not intended to be 
nor did it rise to the level of a "clear, distinct, direct, unqualified, and intentional" 
acknowledgement of a debt or liability. Exhibit No. 27 was nothing more than a reference 
to Petitioner's calculation of a rent debt owed and was used only for the purpose of 
demonstrating what the value of Respondent's equity would be in the Fashion Furniture 
business. (Tr. p. 137) 
Respondent did not acknowledge the debt in Exhibit 27, but only referred to it for 
illustrative purposes to show that even if the debt were accurate, Respondent would still 
receive a considerable amount of money from the Fashion Furniture business based upon 
her own analysis of the assets and inventory. Moreover, Respondent did, in fact, qualify the 
debt by stating on Exhibit 27 "Robert Larsen—their estimate." This qualification of "their 
estimate" was made by Respondent to show that Respondent did not agree with "their 
estimate," and that the estimate was based upon "their" beliefs and not upon hers. 
Nonetheless, Respondent included the amount on the list as a claim purportedly due to 
Petitioner's parents. Exhibit 27 was not signed by Respondent as required by §70-12-44 and 
is not a clear, distinct, direct, unqualified, and intentional acknowledgement of an old debt. 
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Respondent believes that the Court committed error in so finding. 
Respondent asserts that the Court erroneously concluded that she had acknowledged 
a rental amount due to Robert and LaRue Larsen. Respondent further asserts that the Court 
erroneously concluded that the statute of limitations does not apply in this case. 
B. "Inventory" and "Interest" 
Respondent asserts that the Court erroneously concluded that she acknowledged a 
debt owed for "inventory" and/or a debt owed for interest on any amounts due to Robert 
and LaRue Larsen. The alleged interest would have been pursuant to the verbal rental 
agreement between Petitioner, Respondent, and Mr. and Mrs. Robert Larsen. By the terms 
of the agreement it would have taken more than a year to fulfill and thus falls under the 
Statute of Frauds and thus should not have been permitted by the Court as debt owned to 
Robert and LaRue Larsen. 
Respondent, at no time, acknowledged that she owed Robert and LaRue Larsen 
money for "inventory" items. It was error for the Court to make that finding without a 
sufficient showing of evidence by any of the parties concerning this debt 
Further, the alleged 12 percent (12%) interest for the verbal rental agreement should 
not have been permitted as part of the debt owed to Robert and LaRue Larsen where again 
using Rule 59(a)(6) there was insufficiency of evidence concerning that interest to make 
such a finding. 
Additionally, the interest was pursuant to a verbal rental agreement that was to last 
for more than one year. The rental agreement should have been void on its face under 
U.C.A. §25-5-1 requiring that a rental agreement for over one year must be in writing. The 
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verbal rental agreement was unenforceable. Furthermore, the alleged interest agreement 
for the verbal rental agreement was also unenforceable and void. Utah Code Annotated, 
§25-5-4 states that "(1) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one 
year from the making of the agreement" is "void unless the agreement, or some note or 
memorandum of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the 
agreement[.]" 
The alleged interest agreement by its terms would have to be for more than one year 
where it was to be based on a rental agreement for more than one year. Because of this it is 
required to be in writing and signed by Petitioner and/or Respondent. No such writing 
exists. Thus the alleged interest agreement is void. 
Respondent did not acknowledge a debt for "inventory" or "interest". There was no 
evidence to demonstrate that the parties to the "rental agreement" agreed to pay interest or 
to give credit for "inventory". The Court erroneously imputed an agreement that Petitioner 
and Respondent had an obligation to pay interest. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial Court erred in considering evidence of the settlement agreement entered 
into between the parties regarding the sale of the motel owned by RCI, LC. The trial 
Court erred in concluding that Respondent acknowledged a debt for rent due to Robert 
and LaRue Larsen. The trial Court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations 
does not apply. The Court erred in concluding that Respondent acknowledged a debt for 
inventory and/or a debt owed for interest on any amounts due to Robert and LaRue 
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Larsen. Respondent respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial Court and 
remand the case for determination of Respondent's distributive share of the marital 
estate. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / T c i a y of September, 2005. 
ESPLIN I WEIGHT 
G A l t a ^ WEIGHT 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
UCA, §25-5-1 
UCA, §25-5-4 
UCA §78-2a-3(2)(h) 
UCA, §78-12-25 
UCA §78-12-44 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59(a)(3) 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 408 
16 
Utah Code Section ZDO-I 
25-5-1. Estate or interest in real property. 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any 
trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, 
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or 
conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring 
the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
No Change Since 1953 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 25_01002.ZIP 1,800 Bytes 
Sections in this Chapter|Chapters in this Title|All Titles|Legislative Home Page 
Last revised: Tuesday, July 13, 2004 
8/18/900S 
Utaft Loae section z.j-j-t 
25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and signed. 
(1) The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement: 
(a) every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one year from the making of the 
agreement; 
(b) every promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another; 
(c) every agreement, promise, or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual 
promises to marry; 
(d) every special promise made by an executor or administrator to answer in damages for the 
liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or intestate out of his own estate; 
(e) every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for 
compensation; and 
(f) every credit agreement. 
(2) (a) As used in Subsection (l)(f) and this Subsection (2): 
(i) (A) "Credit agreement" means an agreement by a financial institution to: 
(I) lend, delay, or otherwise modify an obligation to repay money, goods, or things in action; 
(II) otherwise extend credit; or 
(III) make any other financial accommodation. 
(B) "Credit agreement" HOP^ not include the usual and customary agreements related to Hpnosit 
accounts or overdrafts or other terms associated with deposit accounts or overdrafts. 
(ii) "Creditor" means a financial institution which extends credit or extends a financial 
accommodation under a credit agreement with a debtor. 
(iii) "Debtor" means a person who seeks or obtains credit, or seeks or receives a financial 
accommodation, under a credit agreement with a financial institution. 
(iv) "Financial institution" means: 
(A) a state or federally chartered: 
(I) bank; 
(II) savings and loan association; 
(III) savings bank; 
(IV) industrial bank; or 
(V) credit union; or 
(B) any other institution under the jurisdiction of the commissioner of Financial Institutions as 
provided in Title 7, Financial Institutions Act. 
(b) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(e), a debtor or a creditor may not maintain an action on a 
credit agreement unless the agreement: 
(A) is in writing; 
(B) expresses consideration; 
(C) sets forth the relevant terms and conditions; and 
(D) is signed by the party against whom enforcement of the agreement would be sought. 
(ii) For purposes of this act, a signed application constitutes a signed agreement, if the creditor does 
not customarily obtain an additional signed agreement from the debtor when granting the application. 
(c) The following actions do not give rise to a claim that a credit agreement is created, 
unless the agreement satisfies the requirements of Subsection (2)(b): 
(i) the rendering of financial advice by a creditor to a debtor; 
(ii) the consultation by a creditor with a debtor; or 
(iii) the creation for any purpose between a creditor and a debtor of fiduciary or other business 
relationships. 
(d) Each credit agreement shall contain a clearly stated typewritten or printed provision giving notice 
to the debtor that the written agreement is a final expression of the agreement between the creditor and 
debtor and the written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of any alleged oral agreement. 
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The provision does not have to be on the promissory note or other evidence of indebtedness that is tied 
to the credit agreement. 
(e) A credit agreement is binding and enforceable without any signature by the party to be charged if: 
(i) the debtor is provided with a written copy of the terms of the agreement; 
(ii) the agreement provides that any use of the credit offered shall constitute acceptance of those 
terms; and 
(iii) after the debtor receives the agreement, the debtor, or a person authorized by the debtor, requests 
funds pursuant to the credit agreement or otherwise uses the credit offered. 
Amended by Chapter 92, 2004 General Session 
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78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and 
process necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutor}7 appeals, 
over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the 
Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of 
Trustees. Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the 
Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; 
and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of 
a first degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or 
serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the 
sentence for a first degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board 
of Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and 
paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may 
certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the 
Court of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 255, 2001 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 302, 2001 General Session 
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78-12-23. Within six years — Mesne profits of real property — Instrument in writing. 
An action may be brought within six years: 
(1) for the mesne profits of real property; 
(2) upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those 
mentioned in Section 78-12-22. 
Amended by Chapter 79, 1996 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 210. 1996 General Session 
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78-12-25. Within four years. 
An action may be brought within four years: 
(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an instrument in writing; also on an 
open account for goods, wares, and merchandise, and for any article charged on a store account: also on 
an open account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all 
of the foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within four years after the last charge is made or 
the last payment is received; 
(2) for a claim for relief or a cause of action under the following sections of Title 25, Chapter 6, 
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act: 
(a) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(a), which in specific situations limits the time for action to one year, under 
Section 25-6-10; 
(b) Subsection 25-6-5(1 )(b); or 
(c) Subsection 25-6-6(1); 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
Amended by Chapter 79, 1996 General Session 
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Utah Code Section 78-12-44 
78-12-44. Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise to pay. 
In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an 
acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been 
made, an action may be brought within the period prescribed for the same after such payment, 
acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the 
party to be charged thereby. When a right of action is barred by the provisions of any statute, it shall be 
unavailable either as a cause of action or ground of defense. 
No Change Since 1953 
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Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or 
part of the issues, for any of the following causes, provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of 
fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new judgment 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by 
which either party was prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury, and whenever any one or more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any general or 
special verdict, or to a finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a determination by chance 
or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
(3) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the application, which he could not, with reasonable 
diligence, have discovered and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law 
(7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits, time for filing When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall 
be supported by affidavit Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the 
motion The opposing party has 10 days after such service within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within 
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional period not exceeding 20 
days either by the court for good cause shown or by the parties by written stipulation The court may permit reply 
affidavits 
(d) On initiative of court Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new 
trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall specify the 
grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 
days after entry of the judgment 
Rule 408. Compromise and offers to compromise. 
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a 
valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or 
amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount Evidence of conduct or statements 
made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible This rule does not require the exclusion of any evidence 
otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations This rule also does 
not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, 
negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE 
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable to Rules 52 and 53, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) but is 
broader to the extent that it excludes statements made in the course of negotiations 
